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C H A P T E R  O N E
Rethinking Body, Woman, Sex, and Agency  
in Medieval Japa nese Narratives
Body
Even in the modern West, the body, far from being a term whose meaning is self- 
evident, is in fact a hotly contested concept that has become the subject of con-
siderable debate in the last few de cades.1 Nietz sche’s invective against Western 
thinkers on the grounds that “they despised the body; they left it out of the ac-
count: more, they treated it as an enemy,”2 whether true or otherwise, seems to 
capture succinctly how the body has come to be thematized, a century later, in 
an entirely new field of research devoted exclusively to it. What we might call the 
“body question” has spawned a bewilderingly diverse array of scholarly works in 
the Western academy, much of it a reaction against its own philosophical tradi-
tion, which it accuses of neglecting the body, or worse, showering it with abuse.3
The argument runs that for all the differences between, say, Greek philosophy 
and medieval Christian theology, Western thinking has been marked by a pro-
found dualism in which the body has come to be constituted in opposition to the 
soul/spirit/mind, and that as the unprivileged term in the binary, it has for a long 
time been subjected to systematic neglect or denigration. That Western thought 
is dualistic; that the body has always been in a position of subordination to the 
soul/mind; and that woman, who is identified with the body, has been positioned 
as inferior to man— these, it would appear, are some of the constitutive features 
of the Western tradition.
Many scholars have sought to complicate and pluralize this par tic u lar account 
of the Western tradition.4 They have argued, for instance, that Descartes’s writ-
ings marked a seminal moment in Western thought when a radical break occurred 
with medieval conceptions of the body— for the first time, both the body and 
nature became passive and inert entities, disconnected from the cosmos and di-
vorced from the soul, and the mind became the sole repository of thought and of 
mental pro cesses.5 It has also been suggested that new developments in the sci-
ences in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Eu rope brought about 
new ways of imagining the body. The practice of dissection, for example, led to the 
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body being understood as a machine, which could be observed as an object, and 
analyzed as a discreet anatomical entity, made up of muscle, flesh, bones, viscera, 
and a skeletal structure.6 Regardless of the differences between those who believe 
that the body has been reviled since the dawn of Western civilization and those 
who argue that it is with Descartes that the body became loaded with negative 
connotations, what is indisputable is that “body studies” is born of the need to 
subvert and challenge the discourses on the body produced by that tradition.
Until recently these debates on the body have tended to veer between two poles. 
On the one hand, there are those who insist that there is an ontological basis to 
the body prior to social meaning or linguistic signification. In this view the body 
is first and foremost constituted through biology, which forms the physical sub-
strate upon which different social and cultural meanings come to be inscribed. 
As Chris Shilling puts it, “we ‘all know’ that the body consists of such features as 
flesh, muscles, bones and blood, and contains species- specific capacities which 
identify us as humans.”7 While granting that the specific features of the body may 
change over time— bones grow brittle, hair thins, the flesh sags— the body, under-
stood as a biological entity, is in this view universal, regardless of time or place.
On the other hand, the social constructivist approach has sought to move 
away from an emphasis on the physicality of the body and the attendant dangers 
of biological reductionism, by focusing instead on the body’s symbolic forms, and 
on the meanings with which it is inscribed in different cultural and historical con-
texts. This approach makes the idea of the body as a given, with fixed meanings, 
unsustainable. For, like childhood, death, madness, sex, and so on the body too 
now has a history, and far from being universal and stable, bodies are seen as par-
tic u lar, contingent, and changing formations that are historically and culturally 
variable. We recognize, not least because of the work of Michel Foucault, that the 
“body” is historically constructed and that it varies even in the history of the West.8
These contesting claims, for all their differences, have been framed within the 
mind/body and nature/culture debates, which have haunted Western thought 
since the eigh teenth century.9 Given that these debates belong to a history that 
has little to do with the world of medieval Japan, is there a way in which we can 
speak about the body in medieval Japa nese texts, without reproducing some of 
the core presumptions that have gone into its making as a category? I would sug-
gest that the body/bodies we encounter in these texts begin to acquire some sem-
blance of intelligibility only when they are inserted within the context of the larger 
epistemic framework of what one might loosely call the East Asian medical, reli-
gious, and philosophical traditions within which they are produced.10
The medieval Japa nese world shared with its Eu ro pean medieval counterparts 
a conception of the cosmos in which the human and natural order  were integrally 
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linked. This was a world in which men, women, animals, and gods inhabited a 
common cosmological order, often intermingling promiscuously with one an-
other; gods  were active agents and nature was a living presence, yet to be reduced 
to a passive object, to be given meaning by the Man of Reason. The relationship 
between the body and mind was not the site of troubled debates in the East Asian 
traditions, in the way that it was in Western thought. The question that pre-
occupied Daoists and Buddhists alike was not whether the body and mind  were 
connected (for it was assumed that they  were); it was rather how the two could 
work most effectively together as a mind- body complex. The body, in this frame-
work, was not reducible to muscle, flesh, and bone. Nor was it inert and passive 
matter, divorced from the mind. Mental and affective pro cesses  were understood 
as integral parts of its materiality, and the body was envisaged as a psychosomatic 
pro cess, “something done, rather than something one has.” 11 “Thought” did not 
function as the other of “feeling” or emotion, nor was form the antithesis of 
matter. In the medieval Japa nese tradition, the word kokoro referred to both heart 
and mind; the verb omou encapsulated both feeling and thinking,12 and the 
word for love, koi, made no distinction between the physical and spiritual as-
pects of love. Both material and mental/emotional pro cesses  were central to the 
constitution of a meaningful body/self.
In Daoist religious and medical discourses, for example, the body is under-
stood as linked to material and psychical pro cesses alike through psychophysical 
matter or energy (Ch. qi; Jp. ki), and the energy arterial pulses (Jp. myaku). To-
gether, they constitute the life force of the self. It is as if the distinction between 
the internal and the external does not apply, for the body presents itself as a per-
fectly transparent entity in which the viscera and organs are openly displayed. We 
are far removed  here from the Western practice of dissection in which “the vis-
cera are truths buried in and under dense flesh, and fat and bone . . .  secrets that 
have to be uncovered.” 13 This has implications for how the body is imagined and 
visualized in literary and visual texts.
Mark Elvin’s observation that “Chinese pictures of the human body, clothed 
or semi- clothed, are—to Western eyes— meagre, schematic and inadequate,” 14 
highlights the limits of the intelligibility of the body when it fails to correspond 
to the one that was produced in post- Renaissance Eu rope, and to which we are 
heirs. As John Hay observes, the literary and pictorial traditions of the premodern 
period in China have no “image of a body as a  whole object, least of all as a solid 
and well shaped entity whose shapeliness is supported by the structure of the 
skeleton and defined in the exteriority of swelling muscle and enclosing flesh.” 15 
It is the principle of linearity underlying the energy arterial pulses, he argues, that 
“provided the most convincing way of embodying the kind of structures that gave 
Rethinking Body, Woman, Sex, and Agency   13
the body both its existence and its life.” 16 This insight is highly suggestive for, as I 
argue in the following chapter, it is precisely through robes and hair, whose lin-
ear forms are analogous to the energy arterial pulses through which qi flows, that 
the body is imagined in a text such as the Genji.
Invoking the historicity of the body is not to claim that different cultures or 
periods produce one single, stable body at any given moment. We cannot speak 
of a “medieval Japa nese body,” any more than we can of a “Re nais sance body” or 
a “modern body.” For there is always a multiplicity of bodies in play in any given 
historical period, and both how they appear and the significations with which they 
are imbued are subject to the par tic u lar contexts and generic conventions within 
which they are discursively produced. In a courtly text such as the Genji, for 
example, the aristocratic body is imagined as a phenomenological entity whose 
presence is felt, not through elaborate descriptions of its physical appearance but 
rather through its stylized, performative modes. Setsuwa tales, by contrast, which 
speak to a more heterogeneous audience, produce bodies that engage not only in 
the refined arts of poetry and music but also in the more vulgar activities of every-
day life— sex, eating, defecating, and the like. And yet, the heterogeneity of these 
bodies notwithstanding, it may be possible to identify something that makes them 
recognizably akin one to the other, an affinity that rests on certain core presump-
tions that have gone into their making and which are grounded in the epistemic 
framework within which they are produced.
Let me explain further what I mean. In medieval Japa nese pictorial scrolls 
(emaki), the body is made palpable not through the depiction of the body as an 
enfleshed entity but rather through robes and through what one might call bodily 
comportment. The twelfth- century Genji monogatari emaki (Picture Scroll of 
the Tale of Genji), for instance, seeks to capture the world of the Genji through the 
immobile postures of noblemen and women, whose faces, indistinguishable one 
from the other, are sketched minimally through the stylized technique of 
 hikime kagibana (dashes for eyes and hooks for noses), registering little by way of 
emotions, thereby conveying the innate grace, self- possession, and nobility that 
are meant to inhere naturally to those who belong to the upper classes (Figure 1).
It is for this reason that by representing Kumoinokari in an upright position, 
as she approaches Yūgiri to snatch a letter from him, the scroll is able to suggest 
that something dramatic and out of the ordinary has occurred— Kumoinokari is 
in a state of agitation caused by her suspicion that Yūgiri is involved with another 
woman. The bodies of ordinary men and women in picture scrolls of the twelfth 
century such as the Saigyō monogatari emaki (Picture Scroll of Life of Monk 
Saigyō) or Ban Dainagon emaki (Picture Scroll of the Courtier Ban Dainagon), 
on the other hand, are marked by movement and action and exaggerated facial 
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expressions and gestures, signaling the vast distance that separates them from 
aristocrats, whose self- contained bodies are manifestations of their supposed 
mastery of themselves and the world (Figure 2).
The diverse bodies that appear in the Japa nese pictorial tradition are only 
sketchily outlined and are often delineated in a stylized manner. However, regard-
less of the differences of gender and class, the bodies in emaki are repositories not 
only of the physical but, equally importantly, of the par tic u lar mental/social at-
tributes that are believed to characterize different social groups.
The bodies in Buddhist sculpture, which draw on Indian figural traditions, 
appear to conform to some recognizable principles of physiology and anatomy, 
that is to say, with conventions with which we are familiar. The guardian figures 
that flank the gates of temples, protecting the buddhas within, are depicted in a 
lifelike manner with strong, muscular physiques and bulging veins. Likewise, the 
statues of Zen masters, like Ikkyū, are cast in a realistic mode: hair, believed to 
be his own, is implanted on Ikkyū’s head, eyebrows, and chin.
At first glance, what distinguishes the bodies in emaki as opposed to the fig-
ures in Buddhist sculpture is that the latter are depicted realistically. And yet, this 
Figure  1. Genji monogatari emaki and Makura no sōshi emaki (Picture Scroll of the Tale of 
Genji and Picture Scroll of the Pillow Book), 12th century, Tokugawa Art Museum, Nagoya.
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lifelike quality is not an attempt at a repre sen ta tion of the human body as an 
object, whose entirety is captured through the precision and accuracy of its 
anatomical detail. The statues of the patriarchs and guardians are not symbolic 
repre sen ta tions of holy figures, for they are not envisaged in a mimetic mode. 
Rather, they are seen as living embodiments of a life force made manifest in ma-
terial form (Figure 3). What appears to have interested Japa nese sculptors was the 
best way to capture “the energy and power by which the dharma— invisible, in-
conceivable, unknowable— mystically projected itself into the everyday world.” 17
The bodies in these lifelike statues are seen as repositories not only of the 
physical but also the psychic attributes that go into the constitution of person-
hood. Sculpted statues of illustrious monks often contained their ashes, thereby 
suffusing them with the presence of these masters.18 Likewise, in using Ikkyū’s 
own hair to produce his statue the aim was not to create the most perfect likeness 
of Ikkyū; it was rather to inject the spirit of this holy figure into his statue. When 
medieval Buddhist tales speak of people going to the temple to pray before the 
Buddha, it is telling that they do not refer to the “Buddha image” (butsuzō), a word, 
which is a more recent invention.19 That no distinction was drawn between the 
image and what we would call the “actual” Buddha tells us something about the 
way in which the image was seen as making palpably manifest the body- mind of 
Figure  2. Ban Dainagon emaki 
(Picture Scroll of the Courtier Ban 
Dai nagon), 12th century, Sakai 
Collection, Tokyo.
16  Chapter 1
the sacred figure. The eye- opening ceremony (kaigen) that accompanied the con-
secration of a statue or sacred object to formally declare it as being animated by 
its spirit constituted an institutionalized ritual, which reflected the commonly 
held understanding that statues, paintings, stupas, mandalas, and the like  were all 
living sacred presences.
What Buddhist statues exemplify is a conception of the body in which the body 
does not exist separately from the mind; the two are integrated into a kind of 
mind- body (shinshin) complex that functions as a single psychosomatic entity.20 
Life or existence in Buddhist thought is made up of the five elements or aggregates 
(Sk. pañca skandhā) of which the first, rūpa- skandhā, is form or matter, related to 
the six organs of the senses (Jp. rokkon), while the other four are associated with 
mental faculties. The distinctions of form and matter or body and mind have no 
valence  here given that the six sense organs in the Buddhist framework include 
not only what we would categorize as physical attributes— the eye, the ear, the nose, 
the tongue, and the body— but also the mind/consciousness.21 Both the figures 
drawn in emaki and the holy figures that appear in Buddhist sculpture, for all 
their differences, share in the assumption that the body is not mere matter and 
that the heart/mind is integral to its very constitution.
Figure  3. The Indian Patriarch 
Mujaku by Unkei, 13th century, 
Kōfukuji, Nara.
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Neither materialist arguments nor social constructivist claims are entirely 
adequate to conceptualizing the body in medieval Japa nese texts. The social con-
structivist move to historicize the body is critical for recognizing that the mean-
ings with which the body is imbued are not universal or constant, and that they 
are inseparably linked to the social and historical contexts within which they are 
produced. However, historicization need not lead to a denial of the materiality 
of the body, as in some extreme versions of culturalism, where the body seems to 
disappear altogether in a fug of discourse. It is worth taking the corporeality 
of the body seriously, while acknowledging that what constitutes the body’s 
materiality is itself subject to variability. The body we encounter in the East Asian 
tradition is not an anatomical entity made up of flesh, bones, and muscles. Fur-
thermore, its materiality already carries within it the psychological dispositions 
and mental attributes that go into the formation of the body and personhood. 
Even the physical substrate of the body, which we assume to be universal, is itself 
historically variable. The choice between the natural versus the social/cultural 
body that is on offer in these debates is part of a very par tic u lar history that 
belongs to the West, and hence necessarily inadequate to thinking about other 
traditions of embodiment, in which the body is imagined outside of the well- 
worn binary of nature and culture. It is this, to us, unfamiliar body that I seek to 
explore in this book.
Woman/Sex/Gender
It has become part of our common sense to assume that what distinguishes men 
from women is sexual difference and that this difference is biologically de-
termined. As feminist scholars have long argued, sexual difference has been the 
basis for justifying the idea that women are innately inferior to men. It is by as-
sociating them first and foremost with their reproductive functions and, by ex-
tension, with their bodies, that women are seen as being naturally different from 
and, by implication, lesser than men. The profound somatophobia that charac-
terizes Western thought, feminists argue, has had serious implications for the ways 
in which women have come to be positioned within this tradition. For if the body 
has been seen as a danger to the operations of reason, or to the salvation of the 
soul, then it follows that woman, who is synonymous with the body, and with un-
reason, is marked as inferior to man and to everything  else that is valorized in 
that moral and ethical system.22
Scholars who have challenged the idea that the body has uniformly been the 
site of denigration or neglect have had to do so by questioning the assumption 
that there has been a constant and unchanging alignment, in all of Western 
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thought, between male and soul/mind, on the one hand, and woman and body, 
on the other. Caroline Bynum, for example, has argued that gender imagery in 
medieval Eu rope was marked by an extraordinary degree of fluidity and that 
“medieval theologians and natural phi los o phers often mixed and fused the 
genders, treating not just the body of Christ but all bodies as both male and 
female.”23 Thomas Laqueur, likewise, has demonstrated how until the seven-
teenth century, what prevailed was the “one sex model,” in which men and women 
 were seen as having essentially the same sexual organs—no linguistic distinction 
was made between ovaries and testicles, which shared the same name, and what 
distinguished men from women was merely that men’s genitalia lay on the outside 
while those of women  were inverted.24
The one- sex model did not presume that men and women  were equal: it was 
taken for granted that the male constituted the normative model of which the 
female was simply an inferior version. What is significant, however, was that nei-
ther the body nor its sexual organs  were the privileged sites for the justification of 
par tic u lar social arrangements. To be one’s gender, to occupy a par tic u lar place 
within the social order as a man or woman, was itself seen as part of the natural 
order. Both what we would call “nature” and “culture”  were cut of the same cloth, 
part of the same divine scheme, and there was no need to turn to the body for 
affirming this preordained hierarchy. Sex did not function as a biological cate-
gory any more than gender did as a social one.25
The epistemological shift from the medieval world that transformed the body 
into a machine, whose workings  were seen as being governed by the laws of 
nature, and whose constituent elements could be observed and analyzed through 
the practice of dissection, also brought with it new ways of understanding woman, 
sex, and gender. By the eigh teenth century, men and women came to be seen as 
radically different, and the isomorphism of their anatomy gave way to new theo-
ries about the incommensurability of their sexual organs. Among the many causes 
for this there is no doubt that po liti cal developments loomed large. When hierar-
chy was taken as given, and seen as part of the natural order of things, there was 
no specific need to justify the differential and unequal treatment of women. But 
in an age that began to speak of equality and liberty as being the “natural” state 
of man, a rationale was needed for why this equality and liberty did not pertain 
to women (or indeed to those of different “colors” or “races”).26
The radical difference that was seen to separate men from women now came 
to be grounded in a biological truth, a fact of nature that could not be challenged 
or changed.27 In place of the fluid gender boundaries and a belief in the inter-
changeable and permeable nature of the sexes that had characterized medieval 
thinking, sex now became the defining characteristic that marked woman off from 
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man and served as the overarching explanation for differences between men and 
women tout court. For those who sought to contest this view, the chief argument 
became that sexual or biological difference did not determine intellectual and 
other differences. The category “gender” emerged precisely as a way of arguing that 
social roles  were not necessarily bound to sex; gender, it was argued, was “a social 
category imposed on a sexed body.”28
The feminist project of the sixties and seventies assumed the naturalness of 
sex, while challenging the social roles that  were seen as following from “natural” 
biological differences. It was in this context that what we now call “women’s his-
tory” emerged; at the heart of the po liti cal project of feminism that informed 
this history was a radical questioning of the androcentric biases of history writing 
and an attempt to rediscover stories about women, which had been silenced and 
written out of historical accounts. There emerged in these writings an autonomous 
women’s sphere within which women  were active agents, alive, and even rebellious; 
the task of retrieval meant that women from the past could now be re- presented 
as the foremothers of and role models for women today.
The project of writing women’s histories reverberated across many other 
disciplines. Religious traditions came to be interrogated by feminist scholars 
who sought to expose the patriarchal and misogynous assumptions that they 
saw at the very heart of these traditions. Feminists who  were also Christians 
 were the first to undertake a thoroughgoing critique of the scriptural texts and to 
put forward a radical new exegesis of the Christian tradition from a feminist 
perspective.
It is not surprising, then, that in many ways the work done on women and Bud-
dhism mirrors some of the same concerns and strategies that  were first adopted 
by feminists working within the Christian tradition.29 It is within the tradition 
of sixties’ and seventies’ feminism that much of our current work on women in 
medieval Japa nese studies is squarely located. Narratives about nuns, princesses, 
courtesans, and women poets are now seen as central to the way in which we tell 
the story of both Buddhism and literature in medieval Japan.30 Likewise, there 
has been considerable scholarly activity to discover women and their activities 
in historical rec ords.31 Rescuing women who until now  were “hidden from his-
tory” has undoubtedly helped us rethink the nature of medieval Japa nese society, 
of its religious practices, and of women’s place in them.
The project of retrieval, however, has been fraught with problems. Under-
pinning much of our work is the assumption that “Woman” is a self- evident, tran-
scendental category that subsumes within its fold the diverse multitude of women 
who appear in medieval texts. We may grant that women in this period did not 
all belong to the same social class and that there was a vast gap in their material 
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and cultural circumstances. In place of “Woman” we may choose the more 
encompassing “women” as our category of analysis. And yet, this lowercase, 
pluralizing amendment still leaves us trapped in an ahistoricism whereby the 
very pro cesses through which the category came into being is left unexamined. 
What is at issue  here is obviously not the existence of real women, for who would 
deny that claim? It is rather the assumption that women constitute a self- evident 
and distinct category, and that women recognize themselves everywhere and at 
all times as so constituted. Many of the questions and doubts I have raised above 
have been central to recent debates within feminism itself; it is a mea sure of 
our inattentiveness to these ongoing conversations that we continue to speak of 
women in medieval Japa nese texts as if they formed a natural, pregiven identity, 
in little need of further examination.32
What is more, we assume unreflexively that men and women in medieval 
Japan  were merely versions of us moderns, and that for them, like us, the sexed body 
was the single most important and overarching site of difference between men and 
women. And yet, what are the grounds for claiming that men and women, regard-
less of time or place, have always been seen as being constituted through the dif-
ferences between their sexual organs? Neither the “one- sex” model that prevailed 
in the West until the seventeenth century nor the sexual dimorphism that in-
formed subsequent understandings of the body are necessarily applicable for 
interpreting how “male” and “female” came to be constructed in premodern China 
and Japan. As Charlotte Furth argues, classical Chinese medical texts, which 
formed the basis of Japa nese medical theories, conceived of the feminine ( yin) and 
masculine ( yang) principles as complementary aspects of the body, which  were 
seen to interpenetrate both men and women. The ideal body was the androgynous 
one, which held together both elements yin and yang in perfect balance. In Chi-
nese medicine “healthy males and females, when seen as a fertile couple, formed 
the matching yin yang opposites of homologous gender.”33
In this schema, not unlike the one that obtained in medieval Eu rope, sex and 
gender, which are premised upon a division between natural attributes and so-
cial roles, had little meaning given that “the categories of male and female  were 
understood as both natural and social, and their bodily powers  were given spiri-
tual significance as fitting microcosmic participants in a universal order.”34 It is 
for this reason that social relations  were seen as mirroring the same principles 
that applied to the body and to the cosmos. “Male” and “female”  were understood 
as complementary rather than mutually opposed, antagonistic forces. This did not 
imply, of course, that the two  were equal: the male principle was the normative one 
and necessarily superior, but the perfect balance of the two was seen as central 
to producing harmony in both natural and social relationships.
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For all the differences between medico/philosophical texts and literary cre-
ations, what marked the textual tradition of the medieval period in Japan was that 
“man” and “woman” made sense only when imagined in relation to others within 
the society to which they belonged, rather than as autonomous and transcenden-
tal entities, whose meanings  were fixed and immutable. It was often as mothers, 
wives, and daughters, rather than as women qua women, that they  were identified 
in texts. Rather than as individuals, it was their status and position in society at 
large that determined the manner in which they came to be known. In the Tale 
of Genji, for example, Onna Ichi no Miya, Onna Ni no Miya, and Onna San no 
Miya are introduced to us in terms of their social status and their relationship to 
each other as the first, second, and third imperial princesses, respectively. That 
they are women is not without relevance, but what their names signal is the fact 
that they are siblings, born of an impeccable lineage.
If we consider the semantic range of the word onna (woman) and otoko (man), 
it is clear that it was conceptually fluid, carry ing many significations, which  were 
always contingent upon context.35 It is only within the specific context of amo-
rous encounters that men and women in the Tale of Genji appear simply as otoko 
and onna, without any reference to their kinship status or rank. Even  here, how-
ever, what these terms signify is not generic man and woman. Through its use of 
the terms otoko and onna the text evokes those suspended moments when intense 
emotional and erotic possibilities unfold, bringing into play young men and women 
who are still of an age when they can participate in the secular world of amorous 
sport, before their inevitable withdrawal from a life of worldly pleasures and at-
tachment. For example, Murasaki is referred to as himegimi in the Aoi chapter. It 
is when the text suddenly transforms her into onnagimi and Genji into otokogimi 
that it becomes clear that their  union has been consummated.36 Likewise, it is 
when Yūgiri puts all his energies into trying to convince Ochiba no Miya to give 
in to his advances that the text transforms him from Taishō (Commandant), the 
social rank he holds, to simply otoko.37 In the Genji, it is in that moment when 
amorous  union takes place that otoko and onna erase the particularity of the two 
lovers in question, recasting them as figural sites of love, longing, and amorous 
desire.
In the world of the Genji and waka poetry, animals and plants are also 
metonymically associated with otoko and onna— morning glory (asagao), for 
example, is the face of a female lover in the morning; the child who is stroked 
(nadeshiko) is at once a flower as well as a girl, who is much loved and raised into 
womanhood by a man, while ominaeshi (maidenflower) functions both as flower 
and “maiden.”38 Through a thick web of connections the deer is figured as male, 
while the bush clover, for whom it/he pines, is associatively linked to the female. 
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What is striking about the flora and fauna, however, is that they are not treated as 
symbols or repre sen ta tions of real men and women. Everything that exists within 
nature and the cosmos— animate and inanimate alike—is or ga nized around a set 
of correspondences, and male and female is one among many ways of imagining 
relationships that are complementary to one another.
Onna in the medieval lexicon is a world removed from the modern word for 
woman/women, josei, which was coined in the Meiji period and which, as the 
character sei demonstrates, was founded on new biological understandings of men 
and women as constituted through their sexuality.39 There is little to suggest that 
in medieval Japa nese texts sex was “natural” while gender was socially learned 
and “constructed.” It is this sense of the term “gender,” understood not purely as 
a social construction, as opposed to the biological truth of sex, that I seek to main-
tain when I use it as an analytical category in the book. Gender, in this context, I 
see as a kind of script, and it is the specificity of the gendered per for mance, that 
is to say, the particularity of the script that is enacted, that gives substance to the 
categories “male” and “female” in medieval texts. This is what makes it possible 
for a male poet to slip seamlessly into the persona of the waiting female, and 
allows even a monk who has ostensibly renounced the world to enact the role of a 
woman pining for her lover.40 While acknowledging that “textual cross- dressing” 
was less available to women than it was for men in courtly texts, I maintain 
that what it meant to be a woman in a text such as the Genji or the Pillow Book 
(Makura no sōshi) was not predetermined by her sex, and that gender as a perfor-
mative act always left open the possibility of deviating from script, thereby creat-
ing polyphonous voices, which can only provisionally be recuperated under the 
sign “woman.”
Women and Buddhism
I have suggested above that in texts such as the Tale of Genji, “woman,” far from 
being framed as a transcendental category, is endowed with different meanings, 
which are always contingent upon context, and that in these texts, being a woman 
is not a function of her body’s sexual attributes but rather something that is tied 
to the enactment and per for mance of the protocols that give gender some sem-
blance of stability. But what then of Buddhist canonical texts and pop u lar narra-
tives often used for proselytizing the faith, which identify certain characteristics 
as intrinsic to women, and sometimes claim that these attributes constitute an 
impediment to the attainment of enlightenment? For, as we know, women are often 
seen as being burdened by the five obstructions;41 they are afflicted by particu-
larly jealous dispositions; and their bodies are marked by impurities connected 
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to menstruation and childbirth, which call for special injunctions prohibiting 
them from entering sacred places.
Scholars have focused precisely on these negative repre sen ta tions of women 
to argue that Buddhism is discriminatory toward women, and that the portrayal 
of women as inferior to men is a structural feature of its beliefs and practices. In-
deed, part of the project of reinscribing women into patriarchal historical and 
religious narratives has entailed not only an investigation of the hidden and un-
acknowledged role played by women in shaping Buddhist doctrines and practices 
but also an exposure of the power structures that have been instrumental in their 
discrimination and exclusion.
Many of the debates regarding Buddhist attitudes to women rest on contend-
ing claims that seek either to establish Buddhism’s misogyny or  else to argue for 
its inherent egalitarianism. The claim for egalitarianism can take different forms. 
The fact that women often appear in Buddhist narratives as bodhisattvas and other 
enlightened beings is offered in support of the argument that Buddhism funda-
mentally holds women in high regard. Another approach has been to acknowl-
edge Buddhism’s decline into misogyny by historicizing the different phases of 
Buddhism, claiming that Buddhism’s origins  were pure and unsullied and that 
it became antiwoman only when it became corrupted by influences that  were 
extraneous and antithetical to the core beliefs of its religious system. These claims, 
for all their differences, rest on certain shared assumptions that merit closer 
examination.
Buddhism is often treated as if it  were a single, unitary, purposeful, and highly 
anthropomorphized category (rather than as a heterogeneous set of doctrines and 
practices) that either consciously or unconsciously seeks to impose its will on 
women. The fact that Buddhist texts speak of women’s impurity and sinfulness, 
or of their power to arouse men and trap them in the web of deluded attach-
ment, is offered as incontrovertible proof of the fact that Buddhism holds an 
essentialist view of women as constituted through their sexual organs. In a curious 
circularity, the critique of Buddhism as a religion that reduces women to their 
sex is made precisely by invoking the same master code, sexuality, that gives 
substance and cohesion to the category “woman.” 42
And yet, is there sufficient evidence in the texts themselves to suggest that 
women formed an identifiable group that cohered around the specificity of their 
sexual attributes? The word in the Japa nese medieval lexicon that corresponds to 
the term “body,” mi, like the word shintai, which is used today to signify the phys-
ical body, refers to the bodies of human beings and animals as well as to the life 
force that animates these beings. Mi, however, makes no distinction between the 
physical body and what we might call the psychic, social, or cultural body; indeed, 
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mi extends beyond the body to signify a self, understood not as an individual sub-
ject, or autonomous agent separate from society, but rather as one that is mean-
ingful only as a social entity. It is for this reason that one of the most common 
usages of the term mi is to signify a person’s status or standing in the world. We 
are far removed  here from modern conceptions of the individual, as a lone figure, 
abstracted from society, and often in opposition to it. When medieval texts speak 
of onna no mi they mean more than the physical and sexed body that makes for 
womanhood; for both her mental and emotional attributes as well as her relation-
ship to others as a social being are involved in the constitution of what we might 
call the female body/self.
The body in the medieval context was not something set in stone, where the 
distinction between man and woman was predetermined by their respective sex-
ual characteristics; neither the body nor nature was seen as inert and passive 
matter with immutable attributes. This was of profound significance with far- 
reaching consequences, for it meant that medieval bodies  were granted transfor-
mative powers that rendered the boundaries between gods, humans, and beasts 
porous and fluid. Both within canonical texts as well as in pop u lar narratives, 
women and their bodies became shape- shifting forms that defied any consolidation 
of “woman” as a stable entity.
If the Lotus Sutra made rebirth as a man one of the conditions for attaining 
enlightenment,43 the Vimalakirti Sutra argued that viewed from within the Bud-
dhist doctrine of nonduality, neither maleness nor femaleness could be seen as 
innate or stable characteristics, thereby attesting to the provisional nature of gen-
dered identities.44 In many Buddhist texts, women who lure men into the trap of 
attachment are revealed to be bodhisattvas, and beautiful women turn out to be 
fox spirits or demons, seamlessly crossing the boundaries between the human and 
nonhuman worlds.45
“Woman” in the Buddhist schema was at once singled out by a particularity 
that marked her as different. She was hindered by the five obstructions; her beauty 
was dangerous for men who had chosen the path of renunciation; her body was 
marked by the impurities of childbirth and menstruation. At the same time, 
woman could never be an unchanging and essentialist category, always fixed in 
the same way. For all bodies, even those of women, far from being “the flat, hori-
zontal, immovable foundation of physical fact: sex,” 46  were conceptualized as 
active agents that could defy common expectations and perform miraculous 
transformations, thereby attesting to the power of the Buddhist faith.
That women  were positioned as different from men, and that they  were not 
their equals, is beyond dispute. This does not, however, render Buddhism misog-
ynist, if by that term we mean a conscious and willful hatred of women by men. 
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In a world that was both naturally and socially (understood not as two separate 
realms) hierarchically ordered, Buddhists assumed that women  were lesser than 
men, and there was little need to justify this “truth” by making women the ob-
jects of sustained attack through polemical treatises and learned disquisitions. 
While it is true that women’s shortcomings and sinful dispositions  were often used 
in Buddhist discourse, what these writings sought to highlight was not women’s 
inferiority to men but rather the nature of the profound hurdles that had to be 
overcome in order to attain salvation. In other words, “woman” served as a kind 
of placeholder, who made possible the playing out of questions and solutions that 
 were central to the Buddhist project.
Buddhist texts creatively used the topos of “woman” (marked by par tic u lar 
shortcomings and failings, but only provisionally so), as a skillful means, a hōben, 
if you will, to demonstrate the miraculous powers of the Buddhist teachings, which 
made enlightenment possible for all beings. In the pro cess, what they revealed, 
through the topos of woman, was the temporary and provisional nature of all that 
seemed real in the mundane world of samsāra. This may be one way of reading 
the drama that unfolds in the Devadatta chapter of the Lotus Sutra, in which one 
of the Buddha’s disciples, Sāriputra, expresses doubts about the eight- year- old 
daughter of the dragon king possessing the necessary requisites for attaining Bud-
dhahood on the grounds that the female body was a “filthy” thing, subject to the 
five obstructions. It is by overturning this narrative and recounting how the dragon 
girl swiftly transforms herself into a man and eventually achieves Buddhahood 
that Manjusri demonstrates the shifting boundaries between men, women, drag-
ons, and buddhas. The rhetorical tour de force acquires its par tic u lar potency from 
the use of “woman” as a particularly graphic instance of the ways in which con-
ventional and supposedly unchangeable realities can be overturned and reversed.47 
It is in this sense that the figure of “woman” is structurally central to the soterio-
logical aims of the Lotus Sutra.
Discussions about women in setsuwa narratives, while ostensibly about women, 
also suggest an order of inquiry in which the central point of interest is not women 
qua women. What might be the best way to make one’s way in this world, and 
ensure one’s salvation in the next; how to outsmart one’s partner; how to make 
sense of events that befall one; what might be learned by being attentive to the 
intricate workings of karma? It is these mundane predicaments, attendant on 
living in the world of samsāra, that often find expression through narratives 
about women. Their pedagogical value goes beyond proselytizing exclusively to 
real women, for the textual figure of woman in these tales is a powerful re-
minder to men and women alike of the miraculous transformations that faith 
can effect.
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Agency
I have argued that imputing egalitarianism or misogyny to Buddhism is based 
on the assumption that women constitute a self- evident category and that they 
recognize themselves as such, and hence work in their own interests as women. 
Let me return again to the project of “retrieval,” which presumes the existence of 
a female subjectivity, which is under constant threat by the workings of Buddhism. 
Once “retrieved,” woman presents herself in many guises: she sometimes appears 
to be able to mobilize her agency heroically and act in ways that challenge the 
attempts by Buddhism and patriarchy to degrade her as a woman; at other times, 
sadly, as a creature of false consciousness, she is complicit with Buddhism’s ideo-
logical agenda, or simply a passive victim of it. The project of unveiling women’s 
agency, empowerment, and re sis tance is always haunted by the doppelganger of 
women’s oppression, victimhood, and, worse, their own collusion with patriarchal 
values.48
How we then judge medieval texts that are seen as offering these conflicting 
perspectives becomes an exercise in arbitrariness. To sustain the idea of Buddhist 
misogyny it is imperative to show that women are oppressed. At the same time 
the emancipatory project, built into feminism, demands that women be seen as 
agents, actively fighting oppression. If the texts themselves are resistant to either of 
these interpretations, then extratextual evidence is often mobilized to secure the 
argument— texts  here are often treated as little more than ideological reflections 
of a reality that lies outside of them. In each case what is left unexamined is the 
concept of agency itself.
As I have argued earlier, the medieval world was populated by gods, buddhas, 
men, women, and animals, all of whom consorted together as active agents within 
a shared cosmological order. Humans had yet to be privileged as the sole bearers 
of agency, with gods and buddhas explained away as “projections,” or manifesta-
tions of the human mind.49 In the medieval universe, gods and buddhas  were of-
ten the central actors who instigated, inhibited, or mediated the actions taken by 
human beings. Our privileging of human agency bears the marks of our par tic u-
lar history— modern liberal thought presumes the existence of a subject who has 
complete po liti cal and moral autonomy, and who is naturally predisposed to seek 
freedom. Liberal notions of freedom presuppose the existence of a free will, which 
operates in de pen dent of social and religious customs and traditions, such that 
both a challenge to these traditions or complicity with them are to be read as ema-
nating from a woman’s own desire or will to be liberated or dominated.50 Agency 
is often treated as conceptually interchangeable with the idea of re sis tance against 
relations of power and domination. Even when female agency is not expressly 
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articulated, or is hard to locate, the actions of women are read as signs of a “nascent 
feminist consciousness”51 that may produce effects that challenge or disrupt the 
dominant male order.
Underlying modern conceptions of agency is the assumption that behind 
every act there is the presence of an autonomous individual, who has the innate 
desire to strike out against the norms of her society. What if we  were to let go of this 
anachronistic assumption, and  were to decouple agency from liberal thought?52 
Would it not then open up a space for imagining alternate readings of agency that 
do not presuppose the validity and universality of conceptions and norms based 
on modern notions of autonomy and freedom? It is this, from our point of view, 
limiting notion of agency that is worth reinstating in considering women’s actions 
in medieval Japa nese texts.53
The tradition of taking the tonsure is a case in point. In medieval times, both 
men and women, regardless of their status in society, or the circumstances that 
led to them taking religious vows, shared in the aspiration to become lay nuns or 
monks at some stage in life, in the hope of retiring from the world of social obli-
gations and preparing for a favorable death. Furthermore, there  were many forms 
that tonsure could take, requiring varying degrees of seclusion from the secular 
world. The category “nun,” for example, incorporated a wide variety of religious 
practices and living arrangements, ranging from women who continued to live 
within the  house hold without taking part in sexual activities and procreation to 
those who lived in complete seclusion.
Scholars have singled out nunhood as one of the sites upon which both 
Buddhism’s misogyny and women’s response to it came to be played out in the 
medieval period. Some have seen the act of tonsure as an act of re sis tance to 
patriarchal social arrangements, and in that sense as an illustration of female 
agency. Fighting against the constraints that society imposes on them, women 
who take the tonsure are seen as exercising their right to decide and to choose 
how they want to live. Nunhood, in this reading, becomes the space of freedom.54 
Others, working within the same conceptual framework of agency, have claimed 
precisely the opposite, arguing that the practice of tonsure was proof of women’s 
oppression and subservience in the face of patriarchal domination and Buddhist 
misogyny.55 Or, in another manifestation of their subjection, nuns are seen as 
traitors who betray their own sisters by subscribing to patriarchal norms. As 
Bernard Faure puts it, “What if they [nuns]  were only the ‘spokespersons’ of a 
dominantly male tradition and so complicit in the silencing of female voices?”56
If we work within the framework of liberation or subjection, the par tic u lar 
reading that we favor becomes little more than an arbitrary choice. No one would 
deny that a woman taking the tonsure served a variety of ends, ranging from 
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testing the affections of a lover whose attentions had flagged to withdrawing 
altogether from a relationship that had gone wrong.57 Becoming a nun may well 
have been a consequence of unfortunate social circumstances, but to see these 
acts as manifestations of either empowerment or victimhood reduces medieval 
players to little more than versions of our own selves. If personhood in medieval 
Japan is located in the social, and if it is not imagined as an individual and secu-
lar identity, then agency in this context would have to be disentangled from 
nineteenth- century liberalism, which speaks an altogether different language of 
choice and self- determination.58
This would allow us to read women’s tonsure as providing a socially available 
model for escaping from the trials of worldly life as well as engaging in the per-
for mance of pious and virtuous deeds that work not against but rather in confor-
mity with the traditions and practices of medieval society. It would also allow us 
to recognize why tonsure, which bespoke a faith that enabled both men and women 
to give up what they and the world to which they belonged held most dear, reso-
nated deeply within medieval texts. For tonsure in religious/literary texts, regard-
less of the circumstances that may have led to the act, elicited both admiration 
and sadness in equal mea sure.
Taking the tonsure and leading the life of a nun suggests the expression of 
a very different modality of action, which lies outside of the category of agency 
understood as re sis tance. Often the proper enactment of a pious and ethical life 
prescribed by that tradition meant “losing” rather than “finding” oneself. It was 
for this reason that stories about men and women who had performed acts of great 
self- sacrifice  were retold in various forms over many centuries. The many versions 
of the Karukaya legend, for example, which focus on the religious quest of a fa-
ther who abandons his family to become a monk at Mount Koya, and his wife and 
son who set off in search of him, gain their poignancy from the suffering and ul-
timate death of the wife and the sorrow of her husband, who now turned monk, 
cannot but be moved by the power of worldly ties.
That such stories, which  were often narrated by Kumano bikuni, had such 
extraordinary appeal was in no small mea sure because they spoke to men and 
women alike; by dramatizing a tension that was central to becoming a good Bud-
dhist, they brought to life the pain and suffering that  were the necessary condi-
tions for breaking the bonds of attachment. The forms that suffering and pain took 
 were undoubtedly gendered and it was the stylized enactment of these conven-
tional roles that had the power to produce affective intensities. However, religious 
acts for both men and women involved abandoning the self— understood not as 
an individualized entity but rather as something inextricably tied to clan and kin 
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by bonds of affect and duty— and reconfiguring it through surrender to the as-
cetic discipline and/or devotion required by Buddhism.
When we seek to reveal the misogynist and patriarchal assumptions under-
girding medieval Japa nese texts, we are not surprised to find our claims vindi-
cated in works written or promoted by men, for it is assumed that men, for the 
most part, speak for their sex, in the pro cess maligning or denigrating women, 
their oppositional other. More puzzling and inexplicable for us are those texts 
written by women that depict their own kind as passive beings, who lack the abil-
ity to shape their own destinies. For passivity implies subjection. Often an expla-
nation for this curious lack of female agency in a woman- authored text is found 
by turning to the world outside of it: polygamy and other oppressive social ar-
rangements during the Heian period are made, for example, to account for women’s 
helplessness in texts such as the Genji. In medieval times, this text came to be 
associated with the sin of falsehood and had to be defended from the charge of 
lasciviousness and immorality by arguing that its author was in fact a bodhisattva 
who wished to alert readers to the dangers of amorous attachment.59 Today, we 
no longer take seriously the medieval defense of this text. Modern interpretations 
of the text are equally products of their times and are often situated in secular 
assumptions, which revolve around questions of the in e qual ity of social and gender 
relations. It is not surprising then to find that some of the more extreme denun-
ciations of the sexual politics that the text reveals have come from such secular 
readings, which argue that Genji was a rapist, and that it was the cruelty of men 
toward women that Murasaki, the author, sought to lay bare in her work.60
We may have distanced ourselves from the more extreme readings of our own 
times that caricaturize Genji as a rapist,61 but the ascription of either re sis tance 
or passivity to women continues to color our readings of the female characters 
in the Genji. However, as I have argued, agency understood purely in terms of 
human will and consciousness, acting upon the world, in de pen dent of gods and 
buddhas, does not adequately explain why so many of the protagonists of the tale 
view the circumstances that unfold in their lives less as consequences of their 
deeds in their present lives, but rather as manifestations of karma from previous 
existences.
There is also a problem with conflating gender relations in the real world with 
their textual figurations;62 in medieval waka poetry, setsuwa, and monogatari, 
otoko and onna often function not as literal repre sen ta tions of man and woman 
as fixed and unified categories but rather as variable performative stances that 
make possible a diversity of modes through which love and longing can be played 
out. The man who visits and the woman who pines and waits, rather than serving 
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as instances of men’s agency and women’s passivity, become more amenable to 
being read as figures of speech, which make possible the per for mance of stylized 
gendered positions, working in consonance with and, on occasion, overturning 
the prescribed trajectory of romance.
Misogyny, subjection, passivity, complicity, agency, rebellion, and re sis tance: 
these terms have now become integral to the repertoire that allows us to formu-
late the “woman question.” Likewise, it is “woman” that has become the axis 
around which the terms body, sex, eroticism, and gender— the terms I have cho-
sen as the central analytical categories of this book— now revolve. These catego-
ries I have sought to argue are modern inventions and have a par tic u lar history 
that is rooted in Western thought. However, to the degree that they have now 
become part of our common sense, we cannot dispense with them altogether, for 
the questions we wish to ask of texts that belong to another time and place are 
inevitably driven by our own preoccupations. In charting how these terms came 
to be within the history of Western thought, and in suggesting some of the con-
ceptual difficulties that they pose in our reading of medieval Japa nese texts, I hope 
to have signalled what is at stake when we embark on acts of interpretation using 
concepts that may not have made sense to those who inhabited the texts we seek 
to illuminate.
